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I INTRODUCTION 
Since November 1990 Auckland Police have undertaken a maJor operation m the 
investigation of a persistent serial rapist. It was an investigation that received major 
publicity throughout New Zealand due to the number of attacks on generally teenage 
victims in South Auckland suburbs. On 17 July 1995, a 36 year old man appeared in the 
Otahuhu District Court charged with 24 counts of rape. Outside the court an angry and 
hostile crowd of several hundred people shouted abuse at the man, shrouded in a blanket, 
as he was led from prison cells to courthouse. Many in the crowd were family members of 
the victims. An order was made prohibiting publication of the accused's name, address, 
and any photograph or sketch likely to lead to his identification. Judge Robinson said this 
was in the interests of justice, emphasising the importance of a fair trial for the defendant 
and avoiding any prejudice to the police prosecution. 1 
What would the present situation be if the name of the man alleged to be the Auckland 
serial rapist was not suppressed? What difference would such absence of suppression 
make to the accused, the victims, the public? Would subsequent media reports be 
extraordinarily transformed by the inclusion of a name? What would public reaction be if 
the man received permanent name suppression on conviction? Would the crowd be angry 
and hostile to a man alleged to be the serial rapist but later acquitted? In this case the 
crown prosecutor requested name suppression, an order that generally benefits the 
accused. Does that make any difference to the public interest in knowing the names of 
people appearing in court? The former hypothetical questions demonstrate some of the 
practical issues that arise in the realm of name suppression law. The rationale underlying 
name suppression contain key considerations when addressing any practical issues. 
This article essentially focuses on section 140 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 - the power 
of the court to prohibit name publication of an accused or convicted person. In any 
1 "Crowd yells at mix; accused" The Dominum. Wcllinglon. Ncl, Zealand 18 July, 1995, I. 
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criminal justice system the importance of clear and coherent policies is well recognised for 
the proper and efficient operation of justice 2 The policies and principles underlying name 
suppression involve fundamental propositions of criminal law with well-established 
histories. Part II will discuss the rationale for name suppression with further outline of the 
underlying principles which support or conflict with the concept of suppressing names. 
This will clearly show the topic of name suppression is fully intertwined with the private 
and public good, concepts that have proven complex and difficult to reconcile and assess. 
Part III will comment on an illustration of the controversy surrounding name suppression 
by way of a short legislative history of section 458 of the Criminal Justice Amendment 
Act 1975. 
The primary problem this article addresses in Part IV is the inconsistencies produced by 
the use of name suppression. This necessarily involves an analysis of recent name 
suppression cases in the New Zealand Courts detecting how judges translate principle into 
practice. Arguably the principles underlying the refusal of publication are generalised and 
clear though the implementation of such principles occurs ma haphazard way, common to 
the balancing exercise in a discretion, producing anomalies and inconsistencies. 
Part V will raise the issue whether there is a need for reform or guidelines by the 
legislature to prevent or reduce inconsistencies and increase the control of the discretion. 
It is critical to remember that inconsistencies are a form of injustice. 
' Sallmann and Willis Cnmmal Justice in Australia (Oxford Uruvcrsit) Press, Melbourne. 1984), 2. 
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IJ PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING NAME SUPPRESSION 
Section 140 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 (the Act) provides. 
140. Court may prohibit publication of names -
( 1) Except as otherwise expressly prO\ 1ded in any enactment, a court may ma.kc an order 
prohibiting the publication, in any report of account relating to any proceedings m respect of an ofTence, 
of the name, address, or occupation of the person accused or convicted of the offence, or of any other 
person connected with the proceedings, or any particulars likely to lead to any such person 's 
identification. 
(2) Any such order may be made to have effect only for a limited period whether fixed in the 
order or to terminate in accordance with the order: or ifit is not so made, it shall have effect permanently 
(3) If any such order is expressed to have effect until the delermmation of an intended appeal. 
and no notice of appeal or of application for lca\e to appeal is filed or given within the time limited or 
allowed by or under the relevant enactment, the order shall cease to have efTect on the expiry of that time: 
but if such a notice is given ,\ithin that time, the order shall cease to have efTcct on the determination of 
the appeal or the occurrence or non-occurrence of any event as a result of which the proceedmgs or 
prospective proceedings are brought to an end 
(4) The making under this secllon of an order havmg efTect only for a limited penod shall not 
prevent any court from making under this section any further order having effect either for a limited 
penod or permanently . 
(5) faery person commits an offence and 1s liable on summary com1ction to a fine not excccdmg 
$1,000 who commits a breach of any order made under tlus section or C\ades or attempts lo cude any 
such order. 
Prior to the Act, provisions regarding suppression orders in criminal cases were sourced in 
two areas. First, orders suppressing information could be granted through a variety of 
statutes found unsystematically throughout legislation Second, by virtue of the court's 
inherent jurisdiction judges had power to make any order necessary for the administration 
of justice. The Act clarified interpretation problems that developed when the two 
suppression sources conflicted by restricting the jurisdiction to a statutory base.' 
3 For example sec s 138(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 which specifically pro\1des the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court has been replaced in the areas covered by s 138 to s 141. The courts ha,c no 
powers other than those conferred by statute to make orders suppressing information. 
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The dangerously wide powers previously found in the court's inherent jurisdiction were in 
no way limited by section 140. Concerns regarding draconian use and susceptibility to 
abuse, due to a scarcity of checks and balances, is still prevalent in the specific area of 
name suppression. Such concerns are fundamentally a result of section 140 empowering 
the court with an unfettered discretion. The section is silent on when and how judges 
should exercise such a wide and extensive discretion. 
There are other areas in the Act where the legislature has seen fit to apply name 
suppression automatically or give judges the discretion of maintaining a reasonable and 
proper balance between the public and private principles underlying name suppression.4 
The focus now is on what principles underlie section 140. 
A The Public Interest- Principles Against Name Suppression 
The general presumption, derived from section 140, e tablishes that names will be 
published unless there are very good reasons to the contrary. Name suppression is 
granted only in an "exceptional case" and is considered an "exceptional order". 5 In a 
recent Court of Appeal case Cooke P, delivering the judgment of the court, stated that 
when exercising section l 40 the starting point must always be "the importance in a 
democracy of freedom of speech, open judicial proceedings, and the right of the media to 
report the latter fairly and accurately as surrogates of the public" 6 The principles raised 
by Cooke P concern the public interest, an area well enunciated when the question of 
publication arises, and an area consisting of many facets . 
1 For example section 138 of the Cnmrnal Jusllcc Act 1985 prmides provisions to hm1t pubhcat1on of a 
complainanl's, or any name or particular likely lo identi{v the complainant. in certain sexual olTenccs in 
the Cnmes Act 1961 . 
~ Sec O '\!alley, Police Unreported, 12 February 1993. High Court, Christchurch Registry, AP 40/93. 2. 6 Sec The Queen, Liddell Unreported, 22 December 1994. Court of Appeal. CA 318/94. 14. 
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The precise issue to consider is what the principles underlying the public interest are that 
give rise to such a strong presumption against name suppression, and whether such 
principles are justified. An important distinction to emphasise when considering the 
various principles is the effect of a pre-conviction or conviction situation. The validity for 
rejecting name suppression will be greatly affected when applied to an accused or 
convicted person. 
1 The publicity principle 
The publicity principle involves the concept of an open and public justice system. One 
purpose of the publicity principle is to ensure justice is not practised behind closed doors 
nor conducted in a star chamber fashion. Before analysing any conflict between name 
suppression and publicity it is important to clarify the exact rationale for the publicity 
principle. 
Historically a court hearing is a public occasion and the New Zealand tradition is such that 
the courts are essentially open to the public.7 The justice system is regarded as the 
public' s justice system and a crime is an offence against the community. Subsequently the 
public has an interest in seeing offenders brought to justice which is manifested through 
access and open courts. 
Public trials can have a therapeutic value by allowing people to vent their emotions and 
outrage, especially towards criminal offending. This rationale is limited in that the trial 
procedure is aimed to control and subdue emotions 8 Consequently publicity may be 
important to prevent emotion by demonstrating to the public that the justice system will 
deal with offenders rigorously without the need for a public response. 
Sec C Baylis "Justice done and Justice seen to be done - the public adrmmslrallon of Justice" ( 1991) 21 
VUWLR 177, 184. 
8 Sec alx},e n7. 190. 
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Publicity can be viewed as an aid to justice, accentuating accountability and accuracy. 
Open trials are one of the checks and balances of the system, safeguarding against 
arbitrariness and ensuring that the judiciary acts under the public's gaze to produce public 
accountability. Publicity as a tool to further fact finding occasionally occurs through 
public proceedings producing new witnesses and evidence. Publicity enhances the 
accuracy of the adversarial process since people will be encouraged to tell the truth in a 
public hearing. However advocates of the inquisitorial system argue accuracy is increased 
when people know they are not subject to public scrutiny.9 
The open administration of justice and the phrase 'Justice must be seen to be done" are 
central to the functioning of a democratic system. Publicity is crucial to reassure society 
that laws are applied and thereby encouraging trust in the public court system to increase 
the efficiency of justice. The fact that the courts themselves are also law-makers is 
another justification for public access and public judgments. 10 Public policy as the basis of 
judge's decisions should see such public policy being created in an open environment, free 
of draconian abuse. 
The role of public interaction in the justice system is important for establishing and 
developing norms. Norms are expressed and generated in the long term through media 
and public criticism of the proceedings. As people can not criticise events from behind 
closed doors the creation of norms is therefore used to justify the publicity principle. The 
publicity principle is also an educator in the criminal context. Through open court 
proceedings and subsequent media reports the public is made aware of recent offending 
and methods to avoid becoming the next victim. For example, if violent attacks are 
occurring in certain areas of a city such places can be detoured, or if a particular item is 
being targeted by thieves people can organise improved security. 
9 Sec above n7. l 86. 
10 Sec abmc n7. 189. 
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It is clear a key concept involved in the publicity rationale is the right of public access to 
court proceedings. It is essential to note that section 140 does not limit access to the 
courts as compared to in camera proceedings. 11 Any member of the public has the 
opportunity to attend a trial and see an accused or convicted person visibly in the court 
room. When section 140 is put into operation the prohibition is on the publication of the 
name of the wrongdoer or alleged wrongdoer. Normally the charge will be made public, 
unless it would lead to the identification of the suppressed name, and if proven then also 
the sentencing measure. 
It is contended that name suppression contravenes the publicity principle and limits the 
open administration of justice. Subsequently the question must be asked whether it is 
important for the public to know who has been charged or found guilty of offences as long 
as they know someone has been punished for their crimes. Does the principle of publicity 
and openness demand personal knowledge and pillory of the wrongdoer when in the 
majority of cases no one will ever meet or come in contact with Joe Smith the thief or 
Sally Brown the drug importer? 
The rationale which underlies the publicity principle has been dismissed by one academic 
as of no general application to the suppression of an accused ' s name. 12 It was considered 
that reasons for the publicity principle, such as generating nonns and the accountability of 
judges, did not require the publication of an accused' s name for their continued operation. 
Stronger criticism can be found in the writings of Munday who argued against the findings 
of the Younger Report 13 which held the main objection to name suppression was that it 
would be contrary to the principle of open justice. He concluded that "the reporting of 
names is persistently mistaken for a direct onslaught on the openness of justice, and 
regrettably the Younger Report consecrated this fallacy". 14 
11 For example, section 138 of the Crimmal Justice Act 1985 contains provisions to hold proceedings in 
camera, excluding all members of the public. 
I ' - Sec above n7, 203. 
11 A British mqm1y mto defendant name suppression carried out m 1972 which focused on rnpc cases. 
11 
R Munday "Name Suppression: an adjunct to the presumption of innocence and to the mitigation of 
sentence - I" [ 19911 CnmLR 680, 76 1. 
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The open administration of justice and the right of the media to report court proceedings 
fairly receives support from the principle of freedom of speech. The right of freedom to 
receive and impart information has been emphasised in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 by section 1415 and well promoted by the media. Prohibiting publication limits this 
right but it is critical to assess how much the suppression of a name actually limits the 
right. Freedom of speech is not an unrestricted right in New Zealand. 16 It may also 
conflict with other constitutional rights thus creating the problem of assessing which right 
is the more important democratic right. 17 
Obviously the functioning of publicity will involve the media in practice. The principle of 
open justice in practice depends almost entirely on the functioning of the media. This is 
recognised in Sir lvor Richardson's paper: 18 
Greater difficulties arise in meeting our responsibilities lo the great bulk of the community who 
never come lo the court in the ordinary course and who rely on mcctia reporting for infonnation 
as to particular cases and on the functioning of the courts in general . 
Publicity of the courts has become a topical issue with the recent introduction of a three-
year pilot programme of televising court proceedings. Televising proceedings is a way to 
increase access to the courts yet name suppression problems have been inherent in the 
trialing with essential arguments concerning privacy and right to a fair trial 19 
Name suppression is an exception to the publicity principle but the destruction of the 
publicity principle does not necessarily follow. It is essential to remember it will only be in 
very rare cases the media will be physically excluded from court proceedings Therefore 
1
~ Section 14 Freedom of Ex-prcssion: Everyone has the nghl lo freedom of expression. mcluding the 
freedom lo seek.. receive and impart information and opinions of any kind in any fom1. 
16 For example there are other interests to protect such as the lal, of defamation which protects people 
from false statements. 
10 
See Part II (B) ( 4) "hich considers the confl 1cti ng nght to the presumption of lDDOCCncc. 
18 I Richardson 'The Courts and the Public" I I 995 I ZLJ January 1995. 11. 
19 
For example the high profile murder tnal of Wellington busine~sman John Barlow 1f filmed would have 
had covernge mainl~ limited to filming shots of the trial judge and the back of the heads of both counsel . 
Restrictions imposed by Justice cazor mcluded prohibition of filming the accused. Several \,itncsscs. 
including police officers and pathologists. had asked not to be filmed. Sec "Court restrictions limit 
coverage - TV stations·· The Dominion. Wellington. Ne\\ Zealand. 29 May 1995. 1. 
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they are still able to function a supervisory role over court proceedings. 20 Arguably the 
media will be little concerned wi.th proceedings it can not report . Name suppression often 
produces difficulties for detailed media reporting, stories lose their news value and 
subsequently the public will receive limited coverage of court events. It is questionable 
whether name suppression actually limits reporting in any substantial way. In the case of 
interim name suppression many newspapers still manage to cover major stories. Even if 
interim name suppression does cause problems in reporting, for example in a case where 
publishing vital evidence is excluded due to revealing the accused ' s identity, it is highly 
likely that name suppression would be lifted on conviction enabling full reporting at the 
conclusion of the trial. The suppression of name still leaves considerable room for 
reporting the charge, sentence and the evidence presented at the trial itself It was 
commented on in the High Court that: "publication of an accused ' s name is really only one 
facet of carrying out the Court ' s business in public and that it needs to be emphasised that 
the presence of the media with their freedom of access to Courtrooms is also an important 
safeguard".21 
It has been posited by commentators that the public identification of suspects is not an 
essential requirement of a criminal justice system and anonymity need not signify the 
demise of a civilised and accountable justice system.22 While the publicity principle has 
validity as a principle of importance in a justice system the use of name suppression does 
not hinder or limit the rationale. The publicity principle focuses on keeping trials open, 
maintaining public access and preventing secrecy. The secrecy captured by section 140 is 
the publication of a name while the ethos of the publicity principle continues 
20 For example section 138(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1985, the public ma~ be excluded from the court 
room but not the media. 
21 Above n 5. 
22 Above n 14, 757. 
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2 Publicity as a punishment 
Open justice is subject only to specific statutory exclusions. Such exclusions by statute 
are accepted without controversy in circumstances such as the Family Court and sexual 
abuse complainants but confront immense dissent from opponents of name suppression for 
an accused or convicted person. Some criticism is due to the naming of suspect/offender 
being considered integral to the criminal process. 2~ Publicity in the criminal field can 
operate as a deterrent, a punishment or both. 
Publicity can act as a deterrent to the community by demonstrating that criminals will be 
punished for their crimes, and more narrowly as a deterrent to the individual offender in 
showing that their misbehaviour will be made the subject of public scrutiny. Publicity has 
been viewed as "one of the chief deterrents to evil-doing; and one of the severest 
punishments that evil-doers have to face."24 
There are problems with publicity as a form of punishment. First there is a question 
concerning the nature of punishment and the place of publicity within that framework 
Various justifications for punishment, such as incapacitation, rehabilitation and retribution, 
can occur without the need for public exposure. For example as long as people are getting 
their ')ust deserts" punishment could take place in total secrecy to satisfy a basic 
retributive rationale. Justifications such as denunciation and deterrence, with the general 
public as the targeted audience, are more likely to require an element of publicity. 
Therefore how crucial the publication of a name is to punishment will depend entirely on 
the rationale for the punishment. 
Whether publicity is an adequate form of deterrence is also questionable. Does the 
publication of an offenders name have any real deterrence value? Does the threat of name 
publication prevent crime? The consequences of having offending made public will often 
2.
1 Sec abo\.e n 14, 754. 
' ' Above n 14, 755. 
12 
come to late to the mind of an offender. Also the fact breaking societies rules will result in 
punishment can take place without knowledge of a name. Most criminals remain 
anonymous to the majority of the public where there is name publication unless the 
offender is of a high public profile limiting the deterrent effect in an individual and general 
way. It can still be clearly demonstrated to the community that its values are being upheld 
with law and order maintained without the need for publication of a name. 
There is the problem that publicity can be a harsh punishment: "the pam inflicted by 
unaccustomed exposure to public gaze, by unwelcomed notoriety, by rejection and 
ostracism consequent upon revelation of charges, can grossly exceed what the gravity of 
an offence calls for".25 Situations may arise where the adverse publicity will outweigh the 
nature of the conviction. Publicity as a punishment is therefore often unnecessary in the 
case of minor offending. 
The case of a person charged or acquitted is vastly distinct. Here the crime has yet to be 
proven or is never proven yet the stigma and initial rejection from their peers will linger 
on. There are no logical grounds for punishment before a conviction yet such is the effect 
where name suppression is refused at the interim. The general faith of the public that the 
police do not prosecute innocent people and the cynical view that every acquittal 1s a 
"lucky escape" reinforces the practice of public condemnation before guilt . 26 
The punishment rationale is never applicable before guilt. It is understandable that there is 
generally little sympathy for unwanted publicity of a convicted person yet there may be 
some validity in the former argument when applied post conviction The problem with 
publicity as a punishment is that it is used in an inconsistent way. The majority of publicity 
about an offence is derived from media sources. Reliance on the media for publicity has 
major problems in itself when addressing name suppression. The media function as an 
actor in the open administration of justice occurs in such an arbitrary and inequitable way 
2
~ Sec above n 14. 755 
26 
Sec Cnminal La\\ Reform Comm1ttcc !'he !)uppression of Publicalion of '\'ame of !lccused (Wellington, 1972), sec Statement ofV1e\\S by Ms Webb, 2. 
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that doubts must be raised as to its use in punishment. Not all cases will receive the same 
amount of coverage or in the same depth. Publicity as a punishment is not applied on an 
equal basis as what crimes receive media attention often depends on newsworthiness 
which is influenced by the bizarre, unusual and horrific. The media is essentially a business 
where sensationalism will frequently outweigh the public duty to report court proceedings. 
Cases will be selected for reporting in an arbitrary way and the accused who receives 
adverse media attention may find limited coverage to a subsequent acquittal. . 27 
Subsequently people found convicted of similar offences with similar sanctions may suffer 
more depending on the publicity they receive. To some extent publicity and the ostracism 
from public exposure will depend on the quality of reporting which is unacceptable 
situation for an equitable penal system. 28 
3 Community entitlement to knowledge 
Cases concerning the name suppression of an accused generally elucidate three special 
considerations rejecting suppression in favour of the community entitlement to know who 
appears before the court: 29 
( 1) The absence of publicity might cause suspicion to fall on others. This is 
especially prevalent where the accused's occupation is rare and the community small or 
the crime is particularly notorious and will receive greater publicity and create much public 
anxiety.30 Ill-founded rumours could arise through the grape vine causing considerable 
harm to people unrelated to the charge. 
(2) Publicity itself may cause the discovery of additional evidence by 
encouraging further complainants or witnesses to come forward by having the charge 
brought to their attention by the media 
- Sec above n 7, 206. 
2ll Sec n 7, 186. 
29 
JB Robertson (cd) .1dams on Cmmnal !,aw (Brooker and Friend. Wellmgton. 1992) 3 - •D. 1
" Above n 26, 4. 
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(3) The absence of publicity might present an accused with an opportunity to 
reoffend when they remain anonymous to the public. 
The problem with the above justifications for not suppressing an accused' s name is that 
they will not always be applicable and pertain only to individual cases For example in the 
case of a person accused for the very first time, other factors in favour of name 
suppression may outweigh the possibility of reoffending. 111-founded rumours are a 
possibility when a defendant remains anonymous and is certainly an undesirable result, but 
is local gossip a justified reason to deny name suppression prior to conviction? The effect 
of suspicion on others may be limited by suppressing publication of an accused ' s 
occupation or locality where it could cause suspicion to fall on others. 3 1 
B Individual Interests - Principles For Name Suppression 
Obviously there are factors that outweigh the former public interest principles, because 
otherwise section 140 would be superfluous legislation. That section 140 operates as a 
discretionary exercise ensures that such factors in favour of suppression are inexhaustible 
and subsequently difficult to be definitive about. 
1 Impa<.,1 on the accused and offender personally 
Any accusation that a person has committed a criminal offence, when made public, will 
produce an effect on the accused that will vary from embarrassment to ostracism ~2 The 
smaller the locality and more serious the crime, the greater the amount of adversity, 
suffering and distress to the accused . It appears a harsh society which allows such 
11 Such an order was enacted in R v Police Unreported.. 9 March 1995, High Court, Palmerston ~Jorth 
Rcgisl.I), AP 8/95, 6. 
r - Above n 26, 1. 
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suffering prior to conviction. There is a general acceptance that people should face their 
crimes post conviction and accept any adverse publicity that such behaviour will receive 
from society. 33 Yet even the stigma attached to some criminal offences can outweigh the 
punitive impact required for an offender's crime. 
Where adverse publicity may justify name suppression for the convicted is in the area of 
rehabilitation. For example in C v Police
14
, a conviction for indecent exposure, there was 
support in the psychological material before the court that publicity might set back 
rehabilitation. Other factors influencing the decision were that the convicted person had 
sought professional treatment and there was an indication the offending was related to a 
psychological disorder. 
First time offenders also have a greater chance of receiving name suppression because the 
majority of people who are convicted never reoffend and subsequently the public will not 
need knowledge to be protected. The interests of justice sometimes require that people be 
given a second chance before earning a criminal label in the community. This view was 
highlighted by McGechan J in H v Police: "If this was the first offence of this nature 
[indecent assault] I would have no hesitation in ordering final suppression" ~
5 
2 The impact ofpublicity upon the defendant's family 
The publicity a defendant receives will frequently extend to his or her family because of 
their close association with the defendant Such embarrassment or anguish to innocent 
family members is considered harsh and in exceptional cases will justify name suppression. 
For example, an Auckland man on a minor drug charge received name suppression 
13 Such a ,1e\, was stressed in Sanders , Police Unreported 20 September 199L High Court. 
Christchurch Registry by Tipping J ''People must realise that publicallon of their names 1s part of the 
penally for the commission of cmnes". 
14 Unreported 12 October 1990, High Court, Timaru Registry. 1'.iole Lhe facl the appellant ,,as in poor 
health also was a factor in carmng name suppression. 
1
~ Unreported.. 3 October 1990, High Court, Wellington Regisll) 
16 
because if his offending had become known to the church his children would have had to 
choose between seeing their father or remaining within the church. 
36 
Cooke P commented on the effect of publication to the family in Liddell: 
37 
f Alnguish to the mnoccnl family of an ofTcnder 1s an inevitable rcsull of many convictions for 
serious cnmc. OnJ) in an extraordinary case could it outweigh the general principle of open 
justice and the open reporting of justice. 
Considerations such as the health of members of the family and other special 
circumstances, such as the defendant teaching at his son's school,
38 will cross the 
threshold and especially so where the suppression order sought is only on an interim basis 
and a conviction is not yet established.
39 More than embarrassment to the family is 
required for suppression, otherwise name suppression would become the norm and not the 
exception in the majority of criminal cases. 
3 Effect of publicity on employers and employment 
Publicity of one's crimes can also have ramifications for a defendant's employer in that it 
could adversely effect the business or professional reputation. However this is not a 
persuasive factor in the courts where a deception as to the defendant's character will be 
effected on the public with suppression. For example such a deception on the public was 
considered inappropriate when it was argued that publicity of the accused' s cannabis 
possession charge would effect the ratings of the television show he fronted 4-0 
16 Sec ·'Name suppressed" 'lhe Dominion. Wellington, Ne,\ Zealand, 13 March 1995. 4 
17 
Sec abme n 6. 10. 
18 Sec ff v Police ( 1989) 4 CRNZ 21 5 where permanent name suppression nas granted The ofTcncc nas 
one of minor shoplifling. 
19 Sec ff " Police Unreported., I December 1994. High Court, Trmaru Registr) . AP 28/94 The case 
imolvcd the possible adverse cfTccts to H's mother nho had a scnous heart condil.lon. 
10 Sec Roherts v Police ( 1989) 4 CRNZ 429 
17 
Publicity can have greater detrimental consequences to a professional person who is self-
employed, depending for his or her livelihood on the goodwill of the public.
41 
Nevertheless the courts discourage preserving public confidence in a profession or 
occupation especially where the job involves interaction with the public.
42 
Once again it can be argued that there is no justification for allowing innocent employers 
or careers to suffer prior to conviction. 
4 The presumption of innocence 
A predominant influence in granting name suppression for an accused as compared to a 
convicted person is their entitlement to the presumption of innocence. It is a right 
recognised in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 by virtue of section 25(c).
43 
Punitive considerations are irrelevant to an accused and the stigma associated with serious 
crimes will rarely be completely erased by an acquittal. --1--1 The distressing experience a 
court appearance can have on an innocent person is a major consideration for granting 
name suppression. Fisher J, in a High Court decision, introduced the broad principle that 
the presumption of innocence and the risk of substantial harm to an innocent person 
should be expressly articulated to avoid overlooking the presumption and that "when a 
Court allows publicity which will have adverse consequences for an unconvicted 
defendant, it must do so in the knowledge that it is penalising a potentially innocent 
person. ,,4s 
11 Sec above n 31, 6 ,,,here Greig J stressed it is not the case of a more lenient VIC\\ in favour of those who 
arc educated affluent or in possession of a position of status or importance. but the fact that pubbcil) of 
an accused can have irreparable eJTect on a profcss1onal's career or livelihood. 
·
12 For example in Jones v Police Unreported, Hamilton Registry AP201/89. 6 November 1989. 2. the 
appellant ,,as employed in the debt collection business and was suspected of oJTcnding in relation lo 
monies entrusted lo him. It was held the public was enhllcd lo knm, of the charge. 
41 The right to be presumed innocent until proven guilt3 according to la,, . 
1-i Sec Part II(A)(2) regarding the commonl3 held view of acqu1Uals 
1
~ J\/ v Police (I 99 I) 8 CRNZ 14, 16. Williamson J rcaffinned the presumption of innocence as a 
pnnciple in O '\!alley" lne Police Unreported, 12 Februaf) 1993, High Court. Chnslchurch Regisll), AP 
40/93. 3. Sec also R v Police Unreported 9 March 1995, High Court. Palmerslon North Registf). AP 
8/95. 5, where Greig J slated: " I lhmk it is a matter [the presumpl1on of mnoccnccl which 1l 1s important 
18 
The presumption of innocence is the crucial difference between approaches concerning 
name suppression prior to and after conviction. It is increasingly difficult to justify an 
entitlement to the presumption of innocence after being found guilty in a court of law. 
Nevertheless there is the problem of when the presumption of innocence should cease. 
The presumption could be continued while pursuing an appeal against conviction as the 
validity of guilt is being challenged. 
Some doubts can be raised as to what the presumption affords to an accused. A 
misconception inherent in the presumption of innocence is that it is about factual guilt. 
The reality is that for the purposes of the legal process it is essential a defendant is treated 
as innocent. Therefore people are presumed legally innocent and it is argued that the 
presumption of innocence only applies during the trial and not throughout all other stages 
of the criminal process.
46 For example if the presumption of innocence always applied 
then it would follow that bail could never be denied and it would be wrong to remand 
people in custody.
47 The difficulties with the bail analogy is that once someone is charged, 
even though they are legally innocent, there may be a genuine need for remand to ensure 
that they appear at trial in the interests of due process and the criminal justice system. It is 
comprehensible to understand a departure from the presumption of innocence in bail 
situations where it is necessary to enforce an appearance at trial, yet difficult to reason 
why an accused should be denied the presumption by refusing name suppression. 
48 To 
manifest the presumption of innocence with any real value it should always apply to an 
assessment of an accused's request for name suppression. 
to refer to explicit!) so that there can be no suggestion or feeling that it has not been taken into account" 
Nole the presumption of innocence docs not ah,ays rcccne as much ,,.eight as Fisher J has given 1L sec 
Part IV(3). 
16 Sec above n7, 203. 
17 Sec above n7, 204. 
1
~ Sec N Walker "Cunos1ties of Cnminal Justice" (1975) XL VIII Police Journal. 9 \\here n was argued 
that "it is indefensible to allow even an adult accused lo be identified - unless for some reason he wishes lo 
be - until he is conv1clcd ... ll is a htlle paradoxical that a S)Stem of tnal designed lo give the accused the 
benefit oflhe doubt in court is almost bound to ensure that the pubhc docs the opposite." 
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C Balancing public and individual Interests 
One may be able to conclude that generally there is a legitimate interest in prohibiting 
name suppression for people found guilty of committing crimes against society It is 
extremely difficult for people to feel sympathetic or compassionate towards people who 
are convicted offenders. Paying the price for your crime is an ethic entrenched in 1\lew 
Zealand society. It is questionable whether such an ethic extends to the extent where it is 
acceptable that publicity may punish more people than just the accused. It may be the 
situation that it is a consequence of publicity that people are prepared to tolerate. 
However publicity, and the punishment from such publicity is not equally distributed 
amongst offenders. The purpose of the publicity principle can also function adequately 
without publication of a name, provided that access to the courts is maintained, further 
weakening the argument for refusing final name suppression. 
In the pre-conviction situation, where exactly the balance lies between public and 
individual principles is extremely complex and controversial. It is difficult to justify 
punishment to a person, who is entitled to the presumption of innocence and free of legal 
guilt, as a necessary consequence of ensuring openness and freedom of speech. Equally so 
it seems unfair to make an accused person, their family or employers suffer irrevocable 
damage by publication of the accused's name just to support traditional thought that name 
suppression will in some way prevent justice from being done. 
What seems to swing the balance between the competing interests is the fact that name 
suppression only bans the publication of a name. In the case of an accused there is no 
validity in the argument that the absence of a name will prevent the principle of the open 
administration of justice. Maybe name suppression is disliked psychologically by the public 
because it appears to benefit the "bad people" or the potential criminals. Society's 
curiosity with names should not outweigh the individual right to the presumption of 
innocence. Equal emphasis can also be placed on the fact that section 140 provides a 
flexible discretion. Therefore it is only where the individual accused can demonstrate that 
20 
his or her individual factors outweigh the public interest that the scales will be tipped, thus 
maintaining public interest principles unless the interests of justice demands otherwise. 
Ill CRIMINAL JUSTICE AMENDMENT ACT 1975 
In 1972 the Criminal Law Reform Committee produced a report concemmg the 
suppression of an accused's name. The committee often consisted oflawyers, police and 
a member of the Department of Justice. In summary the majority of nine recommended:-1
9 
That"' hen a person is accused of an offence publication of his name or any particulars that might 
identify him should be prohibited until the case 1s gone into by the Court. unless the accused 
docs not want his name suppressed or the Court considers publication to be desirable in the 
public interest and orders accordingly. 
The minority recommendation went further and expressed the view that there should be no 
authority to publish the name or identifying particulars of any person charged with a 
criminal offence unless and until a conviction was entered. 
50 
In 1975 the Labour Government controversially introduced the Criminal Justice 
Amendment Act 1975 reforming name suppression law by adding section 458 to 450 
into the Criminal Justice Act 1954. The controversy was primarily centred on s45B( I): 
s45B(l) Unless the Court by order otherwise permits, no person shall publish., many report 
relating to any proceedings commenced in any Court after the commencement ofth1s section m 
respect. of any offence, the name of the person accused of the offence or any particulars likely to 
lead to his 1dentificahon unless and unlll that person 1s found guilty of the ofTencc with which he 
is charged, or of any other offence of which he is liable to be convicted in the proceedings, and a 
conv1cllon is entered agamsl lum by the Courts. 
There were exceptions to the section such as if the accused did not want name 
suppression,5 1 or if the court held that it was in the public interest to permit publication. 
52 
19 Sec above n 26, 6. 
~
0 Sec above n 26, statement of views by Ms Webb, -t 
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The prosecutor, or any member of the public who reasonably believes that any member of 
his or her family mjght be prejudiced if publication was prohjbited, could apply for an 
order perrmtting publication. 
53 Section 45D allowed publication where the Police 
requested it for people who had escaped lawful custody or failed to attend court. 
The Labour Minister of Justice, the Hon Dr Finlay, considered that the Criminal Law 
Reform Committee was dissatisfied with the situation of name suppression and required 
change. He accepted that section 45B represented the minority recommendation but 
considered the majority view obscure in recommending name suppression "until the facts 
were gone into". 
54 The Minister considered it important that the Bill was breaking fresh 
ground and fully establishing the hallowed precept that a person 1s innocent until proven 
!,'Uilty.55 The whole purpose of the act was to ensure that a person accused of a crime is 
not incriminated until guilt is established.
56 
Rejection of the Bill by the Opposition consisted of arguments premised on the publicity 
principle and the principle that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done.
57 The Opposition also contended that the court already 
had the power to suppress names where required and the reform the Government 
proposed was therefore unnecessary. 
58 
Whatever value section 45B had in promoting the presumption of innocence was lost a 
year later when National became the Government and kept their manjfesto promise by 
repealing the provision and restoring the presumption of publication. 
59 It was suggested 
that no real evidence was raised that the previous discretionary power of the courts was in 
any way being abused, and that there were technical and practical problems with 
"
1 Section 458(2). 
"
2 Section 458(6). 
"
1 Section 45B(3)(b) and (c). 
1
·
1 NZPD. vol 396, 676, 17 April 1975. 
"" Sec above n 54, 677. 
"
6 NZPD, vol 403. 129. 30 June 1976. 
,, Sec the speech of the Member for Karori above n 54. 679. 
"
8 Sec above n 54, 684. 
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mandatory blanket suppression.
60 The Government adamantly supported the publicity 
principle which is still the major underlying foundation for the presumption in favour of 
bl. · 61 pu 1cat10n: 
IV 
The fact remains that the amendment was b1ncrly unpopular and widely opposed. H was ne,er 
properly thought out It was a body blow to the freedom of the press: it was a body blow to the 
open working of the courts. I take great pleasure in parlic1paling at lhls early stage m wiping 
this iniquitous measure from the statute book. 
TO SUPPRESS OR NOT TO SUPPRESS 
It appears reasonable to conclude that the principles underlying name suppression are clear 
but generalised. The underlying principles can be translated into the starting presumption 
that the use of section 140 is appropriate where:
62 
[T]he possible harm lo the accused or offender or to those persons connected ,v1th him from the 
publicity outweighs the advantages lo the public that accrue from publicity in the majonly of 
cases. 
This necessarily results in the discretion vested in the judges becoming a precanous 
balancing exercise. The judges are only guided by the generalised principles and policies 
underlying name suppression. There are no indications in section 140 as to when a judge 
should grant a suppression order leaving an air of unpredictability in such proceedings 
In the operation of a discretion it is not surprising that judges will be criticised for being 
haphazard, arbitrary and inconsistent.
63 Comments have been made by newspaper editors, 
who undoubtedly have a personal interest in what is suppressed, that the use or misuse of 
wScc above n 56. l lJ . 
60 Sec above n 56, 120. Practical problems mcludcd the lim1lations on reporting and increased 
speculation and rumour. Technical problems were such as what happens in the case of an appeal. 
6 1 Sec above n 56, 121 the speech of the Attorney General . 
6
" Sec above n40. 431 citing Hall's Sentencing in l\ ew Lea/and, 296. 
61 Sec R Neville '"Judging the Judges" (1991) 4 NZJR 12 " ISlome ofus believe that Judges in this counl.l) 
arc pampered., aloof. prone to inconsistencies. and sometimes inclined to shelter. if not from justice. 
certainly form the harsh glare of publicity. those oflheir own background in the professional \\Orld". 
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name suppression 1s causing great concem.
6
-t Subsequently it is important to identify 
where the inconsistencies lie and how judges confront the mammoth task of translating 
name suppression principles into practice. 
A Name Suppression for Convicted but not Accu.~ed 
Initially it appears extraordinary there are cases where an accused will be refused name 
suppression, yet a convicted person will be granted such an order.
65 This is especially so 
when one considers that the principle of "innocent until proven guilty", which is a major 
justification for name suppression, can only apply in a pre-conviction situation 
A factor appearing very persuasive in a final order for name suppression is where the 
offender has had no previous convictions 
66 Yet it is not the position that even people 
who have prior convictions will automatically be refused name suppression 
67 It could be 
concluded that the right of the public to know the comicted criminals in society is not as 
persuasive in practice as was first assessed as a general principle against name suppression. 
M Sec above n 63, 12. 
6
' For example sec Al v Police Unreported 23 August 1991, High Court. Hanullon Registry. APl 18/93. 
where M pleaded guilty lo carelessly using a motor ,ehkle causing injury and II \ Police Unreported 
High Court. Dunedin Registry, AP 45/91, a shoplifting charge. 
li6 Sec C v Police Unreported 12 October 1990, High Court. Timaru RcgislI) . AP 55/90, a charge of 
indecent exposure by a 55 year old man who was a first offender \\ho had an earlier blameless hfc Also 
B v Po/1ce Unreported 5 Februal)· 1990. High Court, Christchurch Rcgisll). AP 17 /90. "' here B pleaded 
gutlly lo a the charge of discharging a firearm near a dn·clling house wllhout reasonable excuse 
67 For example sec // v Police n 35, ,vhcrc the offender rcccrved name suppression and it ,.,as his second 
olTcncc. McGcchan J appeared lo be influenced b) the importance of care for lhe sick and rehabihtallon 
"' here offender is due in part to a sickness. 
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B Inconsistencies in Implementation 
High Court Judges have commented with disapproval on the failure of judges in the Court 
below to record their reasons for refusing name suppression:
68 
I lit has been said before and I hope it won ' t have to be said again. that the absence of reasons on 
a matter of considerable importance such as this is really a denial of the judicial function and a 
denial of any right of appeal . 
Are the absence of recorded reasons a result of the pressure for time on busy judges or a 
result of ad hoe decision making based on intuition rather than founded on the principles 
previously discussed? 
In any society an individual's background will consist of factors that may have similar 
aspects to another's while simultaneously dissimilar in other ways. Such individualism 
raises two problems in the name suppression area. First, individual factors will dictate the 
weight attributed to the various principles. As the facts of individual cases vary 
immensely, the combination of factors will produce different outcomes. Therefore the 
appearance of inconsistency may be explicable for that reason. Secondly, individual 
factors create problems in assessing whether there actually is inconsistency and in 
establishing any guidelines to reduce inconsistency. Nevertheless the need for 
individualised decision-making should not be an available defence for blatant inconsistency 
between judgments. 
Most judgments include an expression that a balance must be found between the public 
need for openness in the entirety of criminal proceedings and the adverse effects of 
publicity on an accused or offender. In relation to an accused person, judges have been 
inconsistent in the weight given to the presumption of innocence. Fisher J is a strong 
advocate of such a presumption and considers it a principle that should be expressly 
articulated to avoid the danger that it is overlooked. 
69 Related to such a principle is the 
68 Tipping J's comment in S, Po/tee Unreported. 17 September 1993. High Court, Timaru RegistT). AP 
66/93 . 
69 Sec Part Il(B)(4). 
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argument that an acquittal is a possibility in every case, and that a not guilty verdict will 
not necessarily remove the stigma of publicity at trial. 
70 
Other judges have overlooked or considered the innocence factor insignificant in 
overriding the principle that the name of an accused should be public knowledge. For 
example Henry J made the comment: "That [the presumption of innocence] applies to all 
accused persons, and cannot of itself justify suppression".
71 In Bickley v Police
72 the 
Judge sympathised with the fact that the publication of the appellant's name would bring 
the stigma associated with criminal activity before guilt or innocence had been finally 
resolved, though considered that it would be for Parliament to say that people should 
have suppression until found guilty if such a position was desirable It appears the 
judiciary has passed the resolution of a difficult issue onto the legislature. This should be 
an indication to the legislature that the controversial issue of name suppression principles 
demands debate in parliament for clarification as opposed to it remaining with an unwilling 
judiciary. 
With judges relying on the need for "exceptional or special circurnstances",7' the adverse 
effects an accused receives from publicity are considered a normal consequence of the 
publicity principle so that something more is required to cross the threshold. Some judges 
consider that if the position was otherwise the floodgates would be opened with whole 
scale suppression as almost everybody' s name would be suppressed for one reason or 
another. For example the harmful effects of publication on an appellant's daughter due to 
psychological factors were considered ones the appellant, as her father, had to face up to 
and deal with. 
74 
011 Sec S & P v Senous Fraud Office Unreported 9 August 1993, High Court Auckland Registry, 
AP 
158/93, AP 159/93. 
' ' Sec Collie, Police Unreported 14 June 1993, High Court, Auckland Registry, AP 106/93, 3 N
ote the 
charge Collie faced was 18 sexually related charges allegedly committed between 1987 and 1992. 
':! Unreported 3 October 199 L High Court, Christchurch Rcgist~, AP 224/9 L 4 Bickley was charged 
,, ith importing into Ne\\ Zealand a Class C controlled drug and a joint charge of possession of the
 drugs 
for the purpose of supply. 
1 Sec YoRasakarn, Police Unreported 29 August 1988, High Court, Hamilton Registry , AP 132/88 
'
1 Sec above n 5. Note interim name suppression \\as provided so the daughter had time to adjust be
fore 
publication In Boves, Police Unreported October 1992, High Court, Hamilton Registry, AP, Do
oguc J 
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Another factor taken into consideration is whether name suppression will cause decept
ion. 
In post conviction cases the courts have been concerned that suppression can amoun
t to 
practising a deception on the public by presenting the convicted as a person
 of 
unblemished character.
75 In Kaminski v Police
76 the employer was aware of Kaminski's 
conviction but was reliant on his credibility with other employees and therefore suppo
rted 
the suppression application. Tipping J refused the order and commented that he could
 not 
accept the proposition that employees have no greater rights to know than the gen
eral 
public: "employees might well feel some sense of grievance if he [Kaminski] is b
eing 
painted by the employer whiter than white when he does not have in reality th
ose 
attributes. "77 
Deception as an influencing factor in name suppression has been inconsistently applie
d in 
the balancing exercise. For example B, a school teacher, convicted of discharging a
 fire 
arm near a dwelling house so as to frighten the occupants, received final n
ame 
suppression. 
78 Counsel for B successfully argued that publicity would substantially affect 
B's occupation as a school teacher when dealings with his students, that "children 
as a 
class could be cruel",
79 and that in declining name suppression the District Court Judge 
had placed too greater weight on the desirability of informing the public. B's convic
tion 
was known to the Principal of the school, but suppression remained a deception to
 the 
children he taught and interacted with in a position of trust. 
commented that the stress and embarrassment cause lo the Appcllanrs \\ife and 
chtld., and the possible 
risk of losing his job, where disadvantages which arc common to anyone accused
 of a crime. Also in 
lleaven v Police Unreported., May l 993, High Court, Auckland Registl), AP, Hill
yer J agreed w1lh the 
lower Court Judge that the mere fact the applicant was getting her life together an
d might lose her job 1f 
her Employer kne\\ of the charges, was a ground available lo hundreds if not th
ousands of defendants 
coming before courts each year, and therefore was not an adequate reason to depriv
e the public knowledge 
of what was happening in the Courts oflm\ 
7
~ Sec n 40. Wylie J considered it enlircl) inappropriate to attempt to lcgllimasc a course of deceptio
n 
with a final order for name suppression. 
"
6 Unreported, 15 February 1991, Hjgh Court, Christchurch Registry, AP 28/9 J. 
"" Sec above n 76. 
'
8 B v Police Unreported., 5 Fcbrua1y 1990, High Court. Christchurch Regtstl), AP 17
/90. 
79 Sec above n 78. 
27 
Underlying preventing deception is the principle that the public has a right to know what 
takes place in their courts. Arguably this extends to the right to know the people charged, 
as well as those convicted, though the public has a greater interest in protection from 
those proven guilty. This is reflected in S and P v Senous Fraud Office
80 where 
suppression was sought till the conclusion of the trial. lt was submitted that the stigma 
from publicity would inhibit S and P' s staff in conducting business activities and the 5,000 
or more people who such represented in important negotiations. The judge held that such 
people had a very legitimate interest in not having negotiations prejudicially affected by a 
matter remote to them.
81 However if the principle is correct, as emphasised in many pre 
conviction cases, that the public have a right to know who accused people are, then 
inevitably Sand P represents a classic case of deception. 
The seriousness of an offence is also applied in conflicting ways in the exercise of the 
discretion. Suppression orders can be justified because the charge is so serious that any 
subsequent stigma will outweigh the public interest in favour of an accused's interests, 
82 or 
the offence is so minimal the criminal stigma will also outweigh the public interest in 
publicity.83 Therefore the seriousness of an offence does not necessarily result in a lesser 
or greater chance of name suppression. 
In H v Police8-l Tipping J stressed, without any substantial explanation, that the Court is 
always very reluctant to suppress the names of people accused of any sort of serious 
crime, yet felt comfortable in ordering final suppression for an offence of indecent 
80 Sec above n 80, the charge was concealing documents for a fraudulent purpose 
81 Sec above n 80. 
82 For example sec above n 11. where the seriousness of allegations of indecent assault If made pubh
c 
could cause permanent and irreparable harm 
K, An example of this 1s found m A/\ Po/tee Unreported. 23 August 1993, High Court. Hamilton 
Reg1stl) . 
AP 118/93. There were hvo charges of careless!~ using a motor vehicle and the risk of acu
te added 
pumshmcnt from publicity outweighed the genernl public interest even through to post convictio
n Note 
there were additional factors such as the appellant ,,as 86 years of age who had been driving sin
ce 1925 
\\ 1thout blemish. 
8 1 Unreported, 24 May 1991 . High Court, Dunedin Registry, AP -l5/9 I. the charge was sexual , 1olat
1on by 
rnpc. Name suppression ,,as mainly granted because there "as a risk the complaint \\Ould be i
dentified 
by publication ofH's name m the small community they both lived 
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exposure that was regarded as deliberate and disgusting. 
85 In contrast, in a serious case of 
indecent assault on a fifteen year old girl Doogue J held. "the community at large are 
entitled to be aware of persons such as the appellant who have offended in this way",
86 
evidently influenced by the seriousness of the crime in permitting publication. 
A problem to address, mentioned previously, is whether the cases cited and compared are 
examples of inconsistency, or just the result of individualised decision-making based on 
relevant differences between the cases. Alternatively if the discretion was being exercised 
on the principles underlying name suppression this should theoretically produce 
consistency as every final name suppression is a deception on the public and every accused 
has the right to the presumption of innocence. The reality of the argument may be that 
what appears as inconsistency is the logical conclusion of individualised decision-making. 
C J)iscretionary Inequalities 
It is important that in a justice system the administration and practice of justice does not 
alienate or discriminate against some sections of society
87
. The corollary of this is that the 
administration of justice must also not appear to favour certain groups of society In 
assessing the effect of publicity inevitably those in the public eye will suffer more because 
they will be extremely newsworthy prospects. 
For instance, where a police officer is accused of a crime, it is often submitted that 
because of their position in dealing with the public there is a likelihood of serious 
harassment if their names are not suppressed. 
88 Recently a police officer was granted 
8
~ Sec Gv Police Unreported, 17 July 1990, High Court, Christchurch Registry , AP 166/90. Note Tipping 
J also considered the serious ramifications for G' s employment on publication as persuasive. 
86 Sec Dishen Police Unreported, 25 February 199 L High Court, Hamilton Registry, AP 7/91. 
81 Sec above 21 . 12. 
88 Sec Dodunsk,, Mitchell Unreported, 13 March. High Court Hamilton Registry , AP 26/89. The name 
suppression order was rejected because Doogue J considered the charges most trivial. 
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interim name suppression prior to conVlction.
89 Name suppression had first been refused 
by JP' s. Tipping J in the High Court considered that there was the possibility that the JP's 
had adopted a harsh stance against T because he was a police officer. Having an 
occupation as a police officer can also work in the opposite direction in the pursuit of a 
name suppression order. The close contact the police have with the public will often 
influence judges against granting a suppression order. For example, in Heyrick v Police
90 
Holland J stated that "public confidence will not be assisted by any suggestion of favoured 
treatment for a policeman in the Courts" Therefore in applying name suppression 
principles when a police officer is the accused there is an obvious inconsistency between 
the judiciary. 
Most judges try to avoid prejudice towards professional or high profile people. In 
Golightly v Po/ice
91 the High Court Judge agreed with the lower Court that persons 
cannot use standing in the community to justify suppression and persons who have 
reached a stage of standing in the community should know better than to get into a 
position where they undertake offending. This view was expressed similarly in Kammskt, 
a fraudulent white collar crime situation:
92 
This is a man of intelligence, holding a scmor position. "1th lots of advantages in life, a great 
difference from many people ,,,ho come before the Courts. If anyone should kno" what is likely 
lo befall them 1f they commit this sort of scnous fraudulent crime such a person should knm, 
Unfortunately there are cases that raise doubts as to the motives for suppression orders 
and judges have consequently suffered criticism. A District Court judge who ordered final 
name suppression to a well-known public figure earned media comment that "it was hard 
not to escape the suspicion that here was an affluent, middle-aged, establishment 
gentleman being sheltered by an affluent, middle-aged establishment judge."
9
' In B v 
89 T v Pobce Unreported, 1 December, High Court Timaru, AP 31 /94. 
90 (1989) 5 CRNZ 32, 33. 
9 1 Unreported, 28 July 1993, Hjgh Court, Timaru Reg1sll}. AP 61/91. Golightly \\as convicted of assault. 
92 Sec n 70. The con\'iction was obtairung a document "ilh mlenl lo defraud, Kaminski held a senior 
position al a share registry . He procured lo be transferred mlo his own name shares m Brierley 
Investments Ltd ha,ing total ,alue of some $30,000. 
93 Sec above n 63 . The conncuon was for failing to furnish GST returns. 
JO 
Police94 the fact the appellant was a well-known sports person ultimately influenced the 
name suppression order on a charge of importation of prescription medicine (anabolic 
steroids). The Auckland High Court also reversed a District Court ruling and ordered 
final name suppression for a 54 year old doctor as justified due his high public profile and 
the circumstances of his alleged offending.
95 It appeared to one journalist as a case of 
being "socially deferential" and an entitlement that was ''over and above that enjoyed by 
the ordinary citizen".
96 
V GUIDELINES OR REFORM? 
In recent times the Court of Appeal has dealt with section 140 on only two occasions In 
Dally v Police
91 the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court order refusing interim 
suppression, though stated that the use of the word "most" was an exaggeration in the 
expression "only for the most compelling reason should a court interfere with those 
principles [public access to courts and freedom of speech] by way of suppression" 
98 The 
charge was for a well publicised murder case. 
99 It was stressed that when the court 
suppresses a name it is usually obeying higher constitutional principles which must be 
above personal hardship and pain. The presumption of innocence was not mentioned as a 
principle, though of some importance the decision was prior to the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. 
9
'
1 Unrcportecl 10 February 1995, High Court. Auckland Regisl~ . AP 228/94 
9
~ Sec above n 6J . The appellant was alleged to hm.e been involved man incident on an alflme f
light the 
charge related lo his bchmfour and he was apparent]} intoxicated 
96 Sec above n 40. 
97 Unrcportecl 14 July 1989, Court of Appeal, CA 204/89 
'>8 Sec abo,c n 97, 5. 
99 The murder of Karla Cardno, a ~oung Lower Hutt teenager 
JI 
Liddel, the second Court of Appeal judgment, did not require an account of
 the 
presumption of innocence due to the fact it was a post conviction case. The court 
made 
important obiter comments regarding the application of the section 140 power: 
100 
A case of acqmttal, or even conviction, of a truly tri\ial charge, ·where the damage
 caused lo the 
accused by publicit) would plainly outweigh any genuine public interest, is an 
instance when, 
depending on all the circumstances, the Jurisdiction could properly be exercised .. The
 room the 
legislalUJ'C has left for judicial discretion in this field means that it would be ina
ppropriate for 
this court to lay down any fettering code. Whal has to be stressed is that the pn
ma faci e 
presumption as lo reporting is always in favour of openness. 
The Court of Appeal cases demonstrate that name suppression is the exception an
d the 
principle of openness will always weigh heavily in the balance against any comp
eting 
individual interests. Judges regularly note that they find name suppression dec
isions 
difficult to make. This is inevitable when they have an infinite number of facto
rs to 
consider within the bounds of established "constitutional" principles. 
Any subsequent refonn for name suppression can follow two general approaches. F
irst it 
must be accepted that with a discretion there is always the potential for inappro
priate 
approaches and decisions. A real effort must be made to work out basic criteria
 and 
guidelines in the specific area that the discretion governs. Controls are needed tha
t will 
minimise the risk of error and abuse while still maintaining an adequate degre
e of 




1scretlonary measure. ln applying a statutory "checklist" for judges in nam
e 
suppression decisions, the principles may be able to be clearly and coherently set ou
t in a 
generalised way, yet it would be difficult to formulate any guidelines for
 the 
implementation of such principles due to individual factors in individual cases. 
For 
example, imagine a "first time offender" criterion where permanent name suppression
 was 
granted for minor first time offending where adverse publicity would outweigh
 the 
required punishment. Different judges would have differing opinions as to when pub
licity 
,m Sec n 6, 15. 
'"' Sec n 2, 59 Gmdclines for the discretion to prosecute was considered m t
he Australian criminal 
justice context. 
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would exceed punishment. While the principle may be clearly set out, the a
ctual 
application remains difficult and further prone to inconsistencies. A list of guideline
 may 
be useful but to avoid controversy the resultant list would be too broad and would f
ail to 
address problems central to name suppression. 
The second approach considers redrawing the name suppression line. Name suppre
ssion 
can be seen to apply along a continuum in that it is applicable at all stages in the cri
minal 
process from charge to conviction or acquittal . At each stage factors appropriat
e for 
suppression may not apply to a later stage. This is seen most clearly in the distin
ction 
between the stages prior to and after conviction and the influence the presumpti
on of 
innocence has at the various stages. 
The various scenarios for name suppression legislative positions are 
I) Total prohibition on name suppression at any stage 
2) Section 140 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 
3) Name suppression until the accused has entered a plea 
4) Name suppression until depositions 
5) Name suppression until the accused ' s trial 
6) Name suppression until the conclusion of the accused' s trial 
7) Name suppression until conviction (the repealed section 458) 
Position (2) is obviously the current state in New Zealand law. Is it the most desi
rable 
scenario? Could other scenarios provide consistent, fair and equitable orders? Positio
n (7) 
once had the backing of the Labour government but has not yet resurfaced in any pol
itical 
manifestos. It could provide greater consistency in predicting name suppression if applied
 
as a blanket provision. Nevertheless in certain situations justice will require except
ions, 
for example the accused might request publication. A blanket provision may n
ot be 
acceptable where it is without any flexibility. Provisions to order publication may
 be a 
necessity where it can be demonstrated there is a need for publication before gu
ilt is 
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established . Yet this would have the same inherent inconsistencies as the current section 
140 as it is only reverses the presumption of publication to a presumption of suppression. 
A possible reform could be interpreting 'until the case is gone into" (the stage the Law 
Reform Committee majority considered name suppression should end) as position (3).
102 
Though stage (3) may not be what the committee intended it has the benefits of allowing 
an accused valuable time in the interim before plea to accept the consequences of 
publication, consult other parties who may be affected publicly, and then publicly proclaim 
their innocence with a not guilty plea 
103 or face the repercussion of a guilty plea. 
Currently New Zealand's suppression prov1s1ons lie in between strict English law 
restrictions on suppression
104 and practices in Northern European countries where 
defendants in minor cases are simply not named. If reform initiates the latter practices this 
would resolve inconsistencies in minor offending by removing the operation of a 
discretion. There is the problem that what is regarded as "minor offending" may require 
legislative definition as the seriousness of an offence can be extremely subjective For 
example, a convicted shoplifter will receive minor legislated punishment while the actual 
act is viewed morally as serious deceitful and fraudulent behaviour such that employers 
and the community would demand knowledge. 
In conclusion the paramount issue for name suppression reform is whether the name 
suppression power should remain a discretion, fettered or unfettered, or whether some 
formulation can be produced to apply name suppression on objective values that would 
annihilate inequalities and inconsistencies. It should be noted that categorising name 
suppression could result in a situation where the underlying principles loose prominence in 
the attempt to categorise. Yet without reform, leaving name suppression in the power of a 
102 Sec above n 26. 
101 U is important to nole while such reform \\Ould be of more benefit lo an accused than cu
rrent 
legislation it is still arguable that the reform would only gi,e a brief time dcla} until the ad\ersc c
fTccts of 
publicity followed a not guilt)' pica. Also m man) cases accused will rcccl\ e mlenm name sup
pression. 
The main diiTercncc is that in the case of the rcfonn example the accused docs not have to argue
 reasons 
for grantmg name suppression m the mtenm. 
14 
discretion, the balancing exercise of weighing private and public interests will dominate 
and a future of predicability and uniformity will remain the dream of an optimist. 
u,, Sec above n 9, 760. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
Jn assessing who should receive name suppression and when, section 140 provides
 little 
guidance for judges. Decisions will be driven by "promptings of humanity"
105 or favour 
publicity as the touchstone. There are problems in the rationale underlying 
name 
suppression. The public interest principles such as publicity and punishment contain
 flaws 
when applied to the name suppression context. The publicity principle can fu
nction 
adequately without the revelation of a name hindering the open administration of j
ustice. 
The punitive consequences from publicity that an accused will suffer is also an unju
stified 
practice. The suitability of publicity as a tool for the punishment of an offender al
so has 
limitations. 
Balancing public against private interests requires finely tuned cales and while gen
erally 
the principles underlying name suppression are clear and coherent inconsistencies c
an be 
found in the application of the principles. Three plausible conclusions for
 such 
inconsistencies are individualised decision-making, the inevitable result of implemen
ting a 
discretion, or the haphazard approach of the judiciary in translating the name suppr
ession 
principles into practice. 
Whatever the source for the name suppression inconsistencies there are valid re
a ons 
which support a reform for the suppression discretion. The minority who appear in
 court 
and request name suppression will frequently have their interests placed inferior 
to the 
majority with the presumption in favour of publication. Jn pre-conviction situatio
ns the 
refusal of interim name suppression is harsh and largely unjustified. Mandatory 
name 
suppression for an accused person would be more acceptable to the general pub
lic, as 
compared to a convicted person, and is where reform should be directed. Such r
eform 
would at least be a start in a movement towards greater consistency in the 
name 
suppression process and would reduce some difficulties that the judiciary faces 
when 
confronting a name suppression application l\iame suppression is a c
omplex and 
10
~ See abcwc n 6, 10. 
16 
demanding area and will remain so as offenders or suspected offenders compete against 
the tyranny of wider public interests for the protection of a name .. 
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